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Abstract 
This study focuses on the supplemented strategies of microfinance institutions (MFIs), in which the MFI 
offers nonfinancial services, such as entrepreneurship related knowledge, in addition to financial 
services to impoverished borrowers at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP). We examine two contextual 
factors–foreign direct investment (FDI) and loan defaults–to better understand the relationship between 
providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and costs of operating at the BoP for MFIs. 
In contexts where FDI is low and loan defaults are high, providing knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship aggravates the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. However, in contexts where FDI is 
high and loan defaults are low, providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship among 
impoverished borrowers does not aggravate the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. Hence, in emerging 
markets where governments welcome FDI and curb loan defaults, MFIs can viably support 
entrepreneurship among the poor. 
 
Introduction 
Emerging markets are home to roughly 84 percent of the world's population (World Bank, 2011). 
Although emerging markets are a source of future investment, growth, and entrepreneurial potential 
(Alon & McIntyre, 2004; Welsh & Alon, 2001), much of this potential is at the bottom of the pyramid 
(BoP)—the poorest tier of the world's economic pyramid. The BoP comprises more than four billion 
people, or around 65 percent of the world's population, who earn less than $3,000 each per year 
(Hammond, Kramer, Katz, Tran, & Walker, 2007, p. 3;Prahalad & Hammond, 2002, p. 51). Further, the 
individuals living in, and the businesses operating at, the BoP often suffer due to the presence of 
institutional voids. Institutional voids exists in contexts where “institutional arrangement[s] that support 
markets are either absent or weak” (Mair & Marti, 2009, p. 41), which may arise from “the absence of 
specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing mechanisms” (Khanna, Palepu, & 
Sinha, 2005, p. 63). Despite the bleak scenario, the relatively untapped population of four billion people 
at the BoP represents a consumer base with a purchasing power of more than $5 trillion per year 
(Hammond et al., 2007, p. 3; World Bank, 2011). Hence, despite the challenges, there is considerable 
entrepreneurial opportunity for the aspiring poor at the BoP (Kiymaz, Alon, & Theodore Veit, 
2009; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). 
Entrepreneurship in emerging markets is unique because BoP entrepreneurs generally create 
microenterprises of “few employees, few assets, and informal operations” (Gudz, 1999, p. 1). Yet 
institutional voids preclude many BoP entrepreneurs from access to (1) financial resources and (2) 
knowledge resources, which are needed to create and grow microenterprises. That is, BoP 
entrepreneurs lack access to financial markets (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012), but also may lack any 
formal education or training (Afrin, Islam, & Ahmed, 2010). In response to the first institutional void 
(lack of access to financial resources), the microfinance industry has surfaced as a potential response. 
Microfinance is defined as the business of providing “loans, savings, and other basic financial services to 
the poor,” where the dollar amounts tend to be small (micro) in size (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor [CGAP], 2011). Impoverished borrowers may use the microfinance loans either for meeting their 
consumption needs or for building microenterprises (Bartik, 2009; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). Hence, 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) help fill the institutional void of lack of access to finance faced by 
impoverished people at the BoP (Efird, 2008). 
Though the microfinance movement stemmed from the aspiring poor's lack of access to financial 
markets, MFIs are increasingly offering supplementary nonfinancial support services to borrowers. One 
such service imparts supplementary knowledge support, often with the purpose of providing support to 
borrowers to become effective entrepreneurs. This support helps fill the second institutional void—the 
lack of access to knowledge resources among impoverished individuals at the BoP. Accordingly, at least 
two strategies of microfinance are possible: (1) a basic strategy: provide only standard financial services 
to borrowers, or (2) a supplemented strategy: support entrepreneurship among borrowers by providing 
knowledge resources in addition to providing standard financial services. Given these two strategies, a 
question arises: Is the supplemented strategy worthwhile for MFIs? That is, is it appropriate for MFIs 
(that, by definition, provide financial resources) to go the extra mile and provide knowledge resources to 
encourage entrepreneurship at the BoP? 
Recent research on the outcomes for MFIs of going beyond their basic mission of providing financial 
resources and supporting BoP entrepreneurship by offering knowledge resources, is often focused on 
the outcomes for the BoP entrepreneur, and shows mixed results. For example, research on the 
socioeconomic impacts of microfinance suggests that borrowers with more education and experience 
related to business are better able to manage the loans borrowed and the microenterprises created 
(Hietalahti & Linden, 2006). Further, research suggests that microfinance programs that also provide 
knowledge services to borrowers motivate the borrower to be entrepreneurial (Afrin et al., 2010). 
However, in a quasi-experimental study of group-lending in Peru, researchers have found that providing 
impoverished borrowers with entrepreneurial and business training in addition to financial support had 
limited effects on the entrepreneurial success of the borrower (Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). From our 
perspective, however, lacking from the literature is an understanding of the effect of providing 
knowledge support on the outcomes of the MFI. That is, MFIs can offer supplementary knowledge 
support services, but at what cost? Understanding the relationship between providing knowledge 
support to encourage entrepreneurship and costs of operating at the BoP is an unexplored area of 
research. Further, given that these MFIs operate in emerging markets, we suggest that contextual 
factors may play a role in explaining the viability for MFIs of providing knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship. 
In this study, we define MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship as the extent to which 
an MFI offers various knowledge resources in order to encourage entrepreneurship among its BoP 
borrowers. We define MFI's costs of operating at the BoP as the MFI's aggregate operational costs that 
include the personnel, administrative, travel, and other costs involved in monitoring the ability of its 
impoverished borrowers to repay the loan (Agarwal, 2006; Shankar, 2007). We argue that the outcome 
of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship might be an increase in the MFI's costs of 
operating at the BoP. This is because entrepreneurial ventures by impoverished borrowers, like most 
forms of entrepreneurship, are risky propositions where failure is a realistic outcome. Failure in the 
entrepreneurial venture could jeopardize the borrower's loan repayment. Failure might also damage the 
credibility and reputation of the knowledge support provided by the MFI. Thus, in providing knowledge 
support to encourage entrepreneurship, MFIs may incur additional costs associated with operating at 
the BoP. 
More important, we argue that contextual factors might play a role in the viability of MFIs offering 
knowledge support. Given that MFIs operate in emerging markets, understanding the importance of 
context is necessary to gain better understanding of the relationship between MFIs' knowledge support 
to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. We consider (1) foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and (2) loan defaults as the contextual factors that moderate this association. 
We define FDI as the extent to which the country where the MFI operates attracts outside investment 
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2008). We define loan defaults as 
borrowers' reluctance or inability to pay off loans procured from MFIs, reflected in write-offs of the 
uncollectable loans by the MFIs. We argue that in unfavorable contexts (where FDI is low and loan 
defaults are high), it might be burdensome, and thus costly, for MFIs to provide knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship. In contrast, when FDI is high and loan defaults are low, the knowledge and 
financial services provided to BoP entrepreneurs can potentially better facilitate the creation and 
growth of successful microenterprises without aggravating the MFIs' operating costs. 
In sum, our article highlights that MFIs can attempt to support BoP entrepreneurship, but will also face 
tremendous challenges in emerging markets. We describe why we believe contextual factors may be 
important for the future success of MFIs, and resultantly, BoP entrepreneurs, and how they are relevant 
to the development of entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The coming sections provide the 
theoretical arguments, research methodology, and empirical results. The final section discusses the 
implications of the findings in relation to the broader literature and practice. We highlight the need for 
governments to create a favorable environment for MFIs—a modern socioeconomic environment that is 
(1) welcoming of and conducive for FDI and (2) discourages loan defaults. 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
Though microfinance is often viewed as a promising mechanism to help alleviate poverty and incite 
entrepreneurial activity at the BoP (Salimath, 2010), the industry is plagued with high operational costs 
associated with providing support to BoP borrowers in inchoate emerging markets (Morduch, 
2000; Shankar, 2007). MFIs' costs of operating at the BoP include all costs associated with providing 
support to BoP borrowers, from costs to secure funds for lending to costs associated with collecting 
repayments (Shankar, 2007). Though they face high costs, MFIs can help alleviate poverty and improve 
economic and social welfare, particularly in emerging markets that are institutionally weak (Goldberg, 
2005; Schreiner, 2002). 
Supporting Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets: Background on MFIs 
MFIs operate in various forms, which are illustrated in Table 1. MFIs, by definition, offer financial 
services. The services offered by MFIs can range from loans to other basic financial services including 
insurance and savings (CGAP, 2011; MIX Market, 2010; Zardkoohi, Bierman, Panina, & Chakrabarty, 
2011), as well as non-financial services such as to offer supplementary knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship (Goldberg, 2005; Robinson, 2001). The MFI's choice to offer supplementary 
knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship among BoP borrowers has received recent attention 
in the literature (Afrin et al., 2010; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011; Morduch, 2000). Additionally, the cost of 
operating at the BoP has become a focal point within this field of inquiry (Agarwal, 2006; Shankar, 2007). 
This includes the cost associated with post-lending monitoring, such as traveling to and taking time to 
visit with impoverished borrowers to monitor their loan usage and repayment capacity (Agarwal, 
2006; Akula, 2008). MFIs that provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship may be the 
catalyst for economic development in emerging markets (Carland & Carland, 2004); however, in doing 
so, these MFIs may incur additional costs associated with operating at the BoP. 
 
As noted earlier, MFIs can adopt two strategies: one in which the MFI follows its basic mission of solely 
providing financial services, and the other in which MFIs provide supplementary knowledge services in 
addition to financial services to its borrowers. The former “basic” MFI strategy is specifically focused on 
the past and present financial status of the borrower. That is, the purpose of the transaction between 
the MFI and borrowers is to provide borrowers, who are determined creditworthy, with loans. These 
loans might be used to start microenterprises. However, less than half of microfinance loans are used 
for such purposes. Thus, these loans are more likely to be used to stabilize consumption, pay education 
fees and medical expenses, or for life events including weddings and funerals (Bartik, 2009; CGAP, 
2011; Karlan & Zinman, 2012). As a result, the only expectation of the transaction between the MFI and 
the borrower is that the loan can be repaid and costs incurred from monitoring the repayment of this 
loan will be moderate. These MFIs are not concerned with how the financial services provided are used, 
but rather that the loans provided to BoP borrowers are recoverable. The focus of these MFIs is largely 
on verifying prelending creditworthiness (e.g., to check whether the borrower's current occupation 
assures a stable/nonvolatile source of income) and negotiating a stable postlending repayment 
schedule. 
The latter “supplemented” strategy, which encourages entrepreneurship by additionally providing 
knowledge resources to borrowers, focuses not just on the past and present financial status of the 
borrower but also on the borrower's future entrepreneurial plans. MFIs that choose to provide 
impoverished borrowers with knowledge services in addition to financial services do so to equip these 
borrowers with the tools necessary to take the risks needed to create and grow microenterprises. Both 
knowledge and education are antecedents to entrepreneurial venture creation and success (Davidsson 
& Honig, 2003; Robinson & Sexton, 1994). Thus, this MFI strategy creates an expectation that the 
borrower will utilize both the knowledge and financial services provided to take on the risk of building or 
supporting an entrepreneurial venture. As a result and motivated by the knowledge support from the 
MFI that encourages entrepreneurship, the impoverished borrower may attempt entrepreneurship. 
However, there is always a hazard that an impoverished borrower, like borrowers in more developed 
markets, might be ultimately manifested as an “incompetent fool” rather than a “dynamic 
entrepreneur” (Lynch-Fannon, 2009, p. 67). 
Even if the impoverished borrower were to be inherently competent, the fact remains that attempting 
entrepreneurship is always a risky proposition, where failure is a part of the game. Thus, from the 
perspective of the MFI and in comparison to the former strategy, adoption of this strategy might 
aggravate the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. To ensure that the loan is repayable, the MFI must 
continually monitor the borrower's ability to utilize the loan effectively for entrepreneurship. The MFI 
has to monitor the borrower in order to protect itself from the potential incompetence of the borrower 
in entrepreneurial activities that could jeopardize the borrower's loan repayment. 
Contextual Factors that Influence the Relationship between the MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage 
Entrepreneurship and the Costs of Operating at the BoP 
Contextual factors are increasingly important in understanding the complexities surrounding 
entrepreneurship in emerging markets (Petricević & Danis, 2007; Tan, 2002; Zdravkovic & Amine, 2007). 
We examine contagion effects arising from contextual factors that may moderate the influence of an 
MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. For 
instance, FDI has been shown to play an important role in the economic development and national 
welfare of the recipient country (Hu & Jefferson, 2002; Meyer, 2004; Zhou, Li, & Tse, 2002), particularly 
in contexts with weak institutional markets (Stoever, 2005). Countries that are able to attract FDI can 
increase local productivity and quality of jobs, increase per-capita income, and improve working 
conditions; all of which are indicative of a positive climate for investment and business. Alternatively, 
contexts that are unsupportive of FDI may produce more difficulties for both MFIs and BoP 
entrepreneurs to survive. However, the presence of FDI in emerging markets does not always create 
ideal business climates. FDI in emerging markets can create complexities for contracts (Cooke, 1997), 
local business owners (Guruswamy, Sharma, Mohanty, & Korah, 2006), and capital flight (Almounsor, 
2007; Kant, 1996). We expand on these issues raised by the presence of FDI in emerging markets in 
Table 2. 
 
Microfinance can be influential in equipping BoP entrepreneurs with the financial and knowledge 
resources needed to create and grow successful microenterprises in weak institutional arrangements. 
Thus, contexts that are politically and socially supportive of microfinance can aid in MFIs' ability to reach 
the aspiring poor. For example, microfinance produces many socioeconomic benefits across contexts, 
such as creating social value through poverty alleviation, increased education, and improved health 
initiatives (Goldberg, 2005; Robinson, 2001), and economic value through development of both hard 
and soft infrastructure as well as incitement of other entrepreneurial activity (Afrin et al., 2010). 
However, contexts that are politically and socially unsupportive of microfinance have spurred 
controversies in emerging markets stimulating political and social backlash against microfinance as 
indicated in Table 3. 
 
Thus, contextual factors can be important in examining MFIs' knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship and the costs associated with operating at the BoP. As such, we examine two 
contextual factors, FDI and loan defaults, as influencing this relationship. 
Contextual Contingency: Foreign Direct Investment 
Tables 2 and 3 highlighted the misgivings that FDI might generate in the recipient emerging markets. 
We, however, believe that such misgivings are unfortunate. FDI can be tremendously beneficial, with 
the benefits documented and highlighted consistently in the international business literature. The 
presence of FDI is influential in the social and economic development of emerging markets, especially as 
related to entrepreneurship (Acs & Szerb, 2007; Yiu, ChungMing, & Bruton, 2007). In emerging markets 
with higher FDI inflow, there are positive contagion effects that result in the dispersion of widespread 
benefits. Though microentrepreneurs, or entrepreneurs that create and grow microenterprises, may not 
be the direct recipients of such FDI, the presence of FDI within an emerging market can strengthen 
financial markets (Chakrabarty, 2009; Goldberg, 2004; Kuroda & Kawai, 2002), and assist social and 
economic development (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Ozawa, 1992). As a result, a contagion 
effect of FDI inflow exists such that FDI strengthens the business climate of the emerging market to 
create knowledge spillovers (Chakrabarty & Whitten, 2011; Fabry & Zeghni, 2003; Whitten, Chakrabarty, 
& Wakefield, 2010), makes the market more competitive, assists the development of new institutions, 
and alters markets and systems to be more efficient and effective (Almor, 2011; Chakrabarty & Wang, 
2012; Grachev, Rogovsky, & Bobina, 2006). While FDI can result in greater formal/contractual business 
opportunities in the host country, there are also positive spillovers that arise from “non-market 
transactions when resources, notably knowledge, are spread without a contractual relationship” 
(Meyer, 2004, p. 260). Thus, in emerging markets in which FDI is present, MFIs may find it easier to 
operate in such contexts. 
In emerging markets where FDI inflow is higher, MFIs may feel more comfortable going beyond their 
basic mission of providing financial services to additionally provide knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship. MFIs that operate in contexts where FDI is higher may be better equipped to provide 
knowledge in addition to financial services to BoP borrowers because the MFI itself is operating in a 
stronger financial market that is more conducive for economic and social development. Further, in this 
context MFIs may provide knowledge in addition to financial support to BoP borrowers. This is because 
the MFI believes that the context is such that it creates a favorable business climate for BoP borrowers, 
and that BoP borrowers will be able to translate these knowledge and financial services into successful 
microenterprises. Thus, MFIs that provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship in 
contexts with higher FDI may experience lesser costs associated with operating at the BoP because the 
investment climate is more conducive for BoP entrepreneurship. As such, it is less risky for these BoP 
borrowers to create and grow successful microenterprises. A positive investment and business climate 
would reduce the concern in MFIs about the ability of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge 
and financial services provided to create and grow successful microenterprises. 
In contrast, in countries where FDI inflow is low, MFIs are more likely to be concerned about the ability 
of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge and financial services provided to create and grow 
successful microenterprises. In these contexts, MFIs may incur higher costs associated with operating at 
the BoP because they are wary of the ability of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge services 
in addition to the financial services provided to create and grow successful microenterprises, but also in 
their ability to repay the loans. As such, these MFIs may go to greater lengths to ensure the knowledge 
and financial services are creating and growing successful microenterprises, but also that the borrower 
has the ability to repay the loan. As a result, we suggest that FDI may be instrumental in moderating the 
association between MFIs' knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of 
operating at the BoP. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: FDI moderates the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. The influence is more strongly positive 
when FDI is lower. 
Contextual Contingency: Loan Defaults 
Loan defaults are a challenging problem in emerging markets. Given the high costs of operating in 
regions with poor infrastructure and facilities, MFIs in emerging markets typically charge high interest 
rates from borrowers (Dehejia, Montgomery, & Morduch, 2012; Fernando, 2006; Morduch, 2000). 
Further, emerging markets also face higher levels of political, social, and economic risks, all of which 
make it difficult for both MFIs and entrepreneurs to do business. Finally, because of inefficient litigation 
in dysfunctional courts, contracts are difficult to enforce. As such, violators are not fearful to breach 
contracts. Thus, in emerging markets, loan defaults can be a major problem. Some BoP entrepreneurs 
may genuinely struggle to repay MFI loans, whereas some BoP entrepreneurs may be reluctant to repay 
MFI loans even if they have the money to do so. This may give rise to borrowers not repaying loans to 
MFIs, resulting in write-offs of the loans (Field & Pande, 2008; Rosenberg, 2009). 
The inability and/or reluctance of borrowers to repay loans exposes a potentially dark side of 
microfinance and BoP entrepreneurship. First, consider the genuine inability of borrowers to repay 
loans. Both social and political elements within an emerging market may spur effects that contribute to 
loan defaults. BoP entrepreneurs may not be able to repay loans borrowed from MFIs, creating grave 
social effects such as riots, deterioration of community relationships, and even suicide and death 
(Hulme, 2000; Montgomery, 1996). Thus, social consequences of the inability to repay MFI loans may 
prevent other borrowers from repaying existing loans or taking out new loans. In addition to social 
effects, political effects may influence the climate for entrepreneurship. 
Second, consider the reluctance of borrowers to repay loans (Futagami & Helms, 2009). Increasingly, 
there are instances where politicians in emerging markets—often influenced by communist, socialist, 
and anticapitalist ideologies—discourage borrowers from repaying loans. Political leaders, government 
officials, and activists accuse MFIs of being exploitative and greedy. The politically spurred backlash 
against microfinance can either motivate or scare borrowers into not repaying loans, resulting in 
nonrecoverable loans for MFIs (Sparreboom, 2011). The MFIs, in the face of such political uncertainty 
and potential threat of loan defaults, react by redoubling their loan-monitoring efforts. 
Thus, political and social factors influencing loan defaults may create contagion effects that impact the 
relationship between MFIs' knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of 
operating at the BoP. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: Loan defaults moderate the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. The influence is more strongly positive 
when loan defaults are higher. 
Methods 
Sample and Procedure 
Our sample consists of MFIs in emerging countries in five regions: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East 
Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Data on the selected MFIs are 
collected by the MIX, a nonprofit private organization that promotes information sharing and 
transparency for the microfinance industry on financial and social performance for MFIs (MIX Market, 
2010). Our data set uses both financial data and annual survey data on MFIs provided by the MIX. 
Financial data is either directly submitted to the MIX by each MFI (or by the affiliated network that files 
on the MFI's behalf) or gathered by the MIX from public documents published by the MFI (such as 
annual reports). The MIX supplements these data with archival documents, such as ratings, annual 
reports, donor/investor reports, and audits to capture market dynamics as well as more integrated 
performance data of individual MFIs. Data are validated by more than 100 quality checks and 
standardized by the MIX in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The data 
are then made publicly available through the MIX website (MIX Market, 2010). 
Annual survey data are voluntarily provided to the MIX by the MFI or its affiliated network. Data are 
submitted through the data submission form (if a first-time submitter) or the profile update form (if the 
institution has previously submitted data to the MIX). Both forms are made publicly available on the MIX 
website. Annual survey data consist of information on services provided by MFIs, governance structure, 
and social performance indicators. The MIX began collecting annual survey data voluntarily from MFIs in 
2008. 
A longitudinal panel data set is created by merging three databases: the MIX annual survey data for 
years 2008 and 2009, the MIX financial indicators database for years 2008 through 2010, and the World 
Bank Development Indicators database for the relevant years. The sample size is dictated by the extent 
of overlap among the merged databases and the availability of non-missing data for the variables of 
interest. The merged panel dataset allows a sample size of 136 firm-years. 
Table 4 provides the sample characteristics. The MFIs included in this sample are distributed across 31 
countries, with MFIs from the Latin American region having largest representation. The World Bank 
(2011) defines high-income countries as those with gross national product (GNP) per capita greater than 
$12,275. None of the MFIs in our sample operate in high-income countries. Furthermore, we verified 
that the MFIs in our sample function primarily in the poorer regions within their respective countries 
(the MIX website provides contact information for each MFI and displays the regions where the MFI 
operates). Fifty-six percent of the MFIs in our sample are non-profit organizations and 44 percent are 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The sample means of financial and operational data suggest 
that an average MFI is a relatively small organization (in terms of total assets and number of employees) 
with a very strong focus on the microfinance business (approximately 93 percent of operations is in 
microfinance). 
 
 Measures of Variables in Hypotheses 
MFI's Costs of Operating at the BoP 
A substantial portion of the operating expense of MFIs functioning at the BoP of emerging markets is the 
cost of monitoring borrowers. Monitoring of borrowers is important for MFIs to assess and manage their 
risk exposure, especially because borrowers often lack property that can be pledged as collateral. Thus, 
monitoring is necessary to ensure that borrowers make their payments on time. This may involve MFI 
personnel traveling from village to village at regular intervals to meet borrowers to assess their payment 
capacity (Akula, 2008). The locations are usually difficult and time consuming to reach due to the tough 
terrains, geographic dispersion, and lack of pubic infrastructure and transportation, all of which increase 
the MFI's operational costs. Accordingly, an MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is measured as the MFI's 
operational cost per borrower, calculated as the ratio of the annual operating expense to number of 
active borrowers. The numerator, operating expense, is the expense related to operations, including all 
personnel, travel, and administrative expenses. The denominator, number of active borrowers, is the 
number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are 
primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the MFI's gross loan portfolio. An individual/entity that 
has multiple loans with an MFI is counted as a single borrower. 
MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage Entrepreneurship 
MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship is measured as the aggregate number of 
various knowledge resources offered by the MFI to support BoP entrepreneurship. The value of this 
variable is zero for MFIs that provide only financial services. The value of this variable is greater than 
zero for MFIs that provide knowledge resources for BoP entrepreneurship, in addition to providing 
financial services. The knowledge resources fall into the following categories as indicated by MIX (MIX 
Market, 2010): 
• Enterprise skills development knowledge: Includes vocational training, technical and 
management skills courses to develop small-scale enterprises. 
• Business development knowledge: Includes information, training, business advice, consulting 
and marketing services, assistance with information and communications technology (ICT), 
technical assistance, and business links. 
• Financial literacy knowledge: Training that addresses topics related to financial planning, 
savings, investments, borrowings, budgets, interest rates, and so on. 
• Occupational health and safety knowledge: Training that aims to inform local entrepreneurs 
about how to ensure safe and healthy working conditions. 
The value of the variable is increased for each knowledge resource provided by the MFI. That is, an MFI 
receives one point for each of the categories, which allows for a maximum score of 4 points. 
Note that a zero score for this measure is a meaningful value—the MFI is fixed to the basic strategy (i.e., 
providing only standard financial services to borrowers). A nonzero score also has meaning. It means 
that the MFI is attempting to (go beyond the basic strategy in order to) adopt the supplemented 
strategy (i.e., support entrepreneurship among borrowers by providing knowledge resources in addition 
to providing standard financial services). Toward this end, different MFIs can choose to provide different 
kinds of knowledge resources. Our measure attempts to capture a wide array of knowledge resource 
possibilities. For example, enterprise skill development is proven to be an important factor in developing 
BoP entrepreneurship (Afrin et al., 2010). Similarly, business development and financial literacy 
demonstrate increased knowledge in BoP entrepreneurs (Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). MFIs can provide 
knowledge to BoP entrepreneurs on occupational health and safety to limit the BoP entrepreneurs' 
health and safety risks in addition to the MFI's lending risks (Wenner, Wright, & Lal, 2004). By providing 
one or more of these knowledge resources, MFIs can help to support entrepreneurship in emerging 
markets. 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Country 
This is measured as ratio of the FDI (foreign direct investment) inflow to gross domestic product (GDP) 
of the country where the MFI functions. The numerator, FDI inflow, is an aggregate of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the country's 
balance of payments (World Bank, 2011). The denominator is the country's GDP. FDI inflow is a 
macroeconomic indicator, which, if favorable, provides a better business climate for MFIs and also 
greater opportunities to create viable microenterprises for BoP entrepreneurs (Havranek & Irsova, 
2010). Inflow of FDI is both an indication of and a contributor to better investment climates, improving 
productivity of the country (Zhao & Zhang, 2010), lowering unemployment (Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi, & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2006), increasing foreign exchange earnings (Ram & Zhang, 2002), and expanding 
domestic investment (Mah, 2010). Moreover, creation and ownership of businesses has been shown to 
be more advantageous in countries that have higher levels of FDI inflow (Yiu et al., 2007). The better 
investment climate fosters stronger business relationships, which is important for MFIs, as well as for 
BoP entrepreneurs by providing them more opportunities. 
Loan Defaults 
Loan defaults are reflected in the extent of write-offs due to uncollectable loans. It is measured using 
the MFI's write-off ratio, which is the ratio of write-offs to the gross loan portfolio. The numerator is the 
total amount of loans written off during the year. A write-off is an accounting procedure that removes 
the outstanding balance of the loan from the loan portfolio and from the impairment loss allowance 
when these loans are recognized as uncollectable. The denominator is the gross loan portfolio, which is 
the aggregate of all outstanding principals due for all outstanding client loans. It includes current, 
delinquent, and renegotiated loans, but does not include loans that have been written off and does not 
include interest receivable. 
Control Variables 
Firm Dummies 
The regressions used for this study are one-way fixed effects regressions, which automatically generate 
dummies for each firm (MFI). By using each firm as its own control, the regression controls for all stable 
characteristics of the firms and uses only within-firm variation to estimate the regression coefficients. 
MFI Size 
Size of the MFI is included as a control because larger MFIs are likely to have a greater influence among 
the community and other stakeholders. Further, while larger size allows for greater economies of scale, 
it can also result in a lack of focus and management/coordination problems. Hence, we control for firm 
size, measured as ln (total assets), where total assets is in dollars. 
MFI Return on Assets 
An MFI's return on assets is measured as a ratio. The numerator is a firm's net income, which is the 
annual income or loss reported by a firm on its income statement after subtracting expenses and losses 
from all revenues and gains. The denominator is total assets, which represents the total assets/liabilities 
of a firm, as reported on its balance sheet. Though return on assets is an appropriate performance 
measure in the management literature, it is often considered a somewhat inappropriate measure of 
performance in the microfinance literature because the majority of MFIs receive substantial subsidies. 
As a result, the question of whether MFIs can sustainably operate without subsidies becomes more 
critical than whether the MFI is able to deploy its assets profitably (Rosenberg, 2009). Hence, we 
relegated the return on assets measure to a control variable. 
Country Prosperity 
Country prosperity is an indicator of economic wealth and quality of life, and is negatively related to 
poverty. Country prosperity is calculated as GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars, based on purchasing 
power parity. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products 
(World Bank, 2011). 
Country Mortality 
The country mortality rate is measured as the crude death rate for the country, or the number of deaths 
occurring during the year, per 1,000 population estimated at midyear (World Brank, 2011). This human 
factor measure, in contrast to the financial measure of country prosperity, is an indicator of poverty and 
poor health infrastructure in the emerging market (Cabigon, 2005). 
Results 
We hypothesized that the influence of MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the 
MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is contingent on levels of FDI in the emerging market and loan 
defaults. In the MIX survey database, annual data for the predictor variable (MFI's knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship) is available for the period 2008–2009. Following standard practice to 
indicate the direction of influence, the data used for control variables and independent variables are 
lagged behind the data for the dependent variable by one year. Hence, data for the dependent variable 
(MFI's costs of operating at the BoP) are obtained for the period 2009–2010 from the MIX financials 
database. 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our study. One-way fixed effect 
regressions are used to test the hypotheses, the results of which are included in Table 6. For the 
regressions, all the variables were standardized (with mean set to zero) to avoid multicollinearity 
problems and to obtain standardized parameter estimates. The independent variables were lagged 
behind the dependent variable by one year, to indicate the longitudinal direction of the effects being 
tested. Figure 1 provides the interaction plots (the moderator variables are continuous, but only the 
lines representing high and low values of the moderators are plotted for ease of visualization). 
 
 
  
 Figure 1. Interaction Plots: MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage Entrepreneurship 
We find support that both of our contextual factors significantly moderate the influence of an MFI's 
knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. First, 
consistent with hypothesis 1, FDI inflow moderates the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP (β = −0.10 with p < 0.05 in model 
M4 and β = −0.09 with p < 0.05 in model M6 in Table 5). As shown in the interaction plot in Figure 1, the 
influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating 
at the BoP is significantly positive when FDI is low (simple slope = 17.44, p < 0.05). Hence, an MFI's costs 
of operating at the BoP are greatest when it attempts to provide knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship in a country where FDI is low. 
Second, consistent with hypothesis 2, loan defaults moderate the influence of an MFI's knowledge 
support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP (β = 0.10 with p 
< 0.05 in model M5 and β = 0.08 with p < 0.10 in model M6 in Table r5). As shown in the interaction plot 
in Figure 1, the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's 
costs of operating at the BoP is significantly positive when loan defaults are high (simple slope = 24.36, p 
< 0.05). Hence, an MFI's costs of operating at the BoP are greatest when it tries to provide knowledge 
support to encourage BoP entrepreneurship in a context where loan defaults are high. 
In sum, the results in Table 6 and interaction plots in Figure 1 suggest that MFI's costs of operating at 
the BoP are greatest when it attempts to provide knowledge support to encourage BoP 
entrepreneurship in unfavorable contexts (low FDI and high loan defaults). 
Discussion 
Our results suggest that the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on 
the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is strengthened when FDI is high and loan defaults are low. This 
study builds on previous research to address the role of microfinance institutions by going beyond their 
basic mission of providing financial services to also provide knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship. We extend this research by examining contextual factors that may influence the 
relationship between providing such support and costs incurred for MFIs. We discuss the implications 
and future research avenues in the following paragraphs. 
Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
Our findings make several important contributions. First, we focus on contextual factors that play a role 
in emerging markets. Mixed results on attempts to encourage entrepreneurship in emerging markets, 
especially by microfinance institutions, direct our attention toward contextual factors that may aid in 
accounting for such variation in results. Our results suggest that going beyond their basic mission of 
providing finance services to additionally provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship 
can become a burden for MFIs in contexts that are unfavorable (i.e., in contexts where FDI is low and 
loan defaults are high). While the intentions might be good, by attempting to provide knowledge 
support to encourage entrepreneurship in such unfavorable contexts, MFIs might in fact be operating in 
bleak contexts, but also may be giving “false hope” to borrowers. This is because the chance of 
entrepreneurial success in such unfavorable contexts is low. The false hope given to impoverished 
borrowers—that they can become successful entrepreneurs in unfavorable contexts—might only serve 
to increase the MFIs' costs of operating at the BoP, and perhaps drive both the aspiring entrepreneurs 
and the MFIs toward financial ruin. This is an unfortunate scenario where good intentions can be 
thwarted by harsh realities. 
Nonetheless, we believe that there is hope for MFIs and BoP borrowers—if governments make efforts to 
improve the contexts. As our results illustrate, providing knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship is worthwhile for MFIs in contexts where FDI is high and loan defaults are low. This is 
because in such contexts, supporting BoP entrepreneurship does not contribute to the MFIs' costs of 
operating at the BoP. When FDI is high and loan defaults are low, the business climate is more conducive 
for the services provided by MFIs. As such, the knowledge and financial services provided to BoP 
entrepreneurs can better facilitate the creation and growth of successful microenterprises because the 
overall climate is one that is favorable for entrepreneurship. Governments can help remedy the harsh 
realities by working toward creating a modern socio-economic environment that (1) is welcoming of and 
conducive for FDI and (2) discourages loan defaults. 
Second, we address contagion effects as related to entrepreneurship in emerging markets rife with 
institutional voids. Contagion effects can be used to understand why some contexts are crafted of an 
institutional fabric that makes sense for MFIs to go out of their way to encourage BoP entrepreneurship 
and why others do not. Though BoP borrowers and even MFIs may not directly benefit from FDI inflows 
in the countries in which they operate, the existence of FDI in these contexts creates contagion effects 
that can aid in explaining how FDI inflows can create business and investment climates that are 
conducive for entrepreneurship. We argue that a business and investment climate that is more 
conducive for BoP entrepreneurship enables MFIs to additionally provide knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship without adding to the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. It is true that the 
largest proportion of FDI flows into industries dominated by large corporate entities. As a result, many 
MFIs and BoP entrepreneurs may not be the direct beneficiaries of FDI. Nevertheless, MFIs and BoP 
entrepreneurs may still benefit from FDI inflows into their country because of contagion effects. 
Contagion effects help explain how the business, knowledge, and resources gained by the large 
corporate entities through FDI ultimately strengthen the social and economic context in the host 
country, eventually impacting smaller businesses (such as MFIs) and even the smallest entrepreneur. 
Furthermore, the ability and/or willingness of BoP entrepreneurs to repay loans can be influenced by 
contagion effects arising from political and social climates of emerging markets (illustrated in Table 3). 
When BoP entrepreneurs are motivated to not repay loans, it results in the MFIs having to increase the 
monitoring of their borrowers. The MFIs must invest more in postlending monitoring to ensure that BoP 
entrepreneurs are successful in creating and growing microenterprises and comply with the contractual 
obligations of repaying loans. 
Third, we address the difficulties of encouraging BoP entrepreneurship in emerging markets. In 
emerging markets characterized by institutional arrangements where investment climate is poor (as 
evidenced by low FDI), social and economic development is stifled (De Mello, 1997), and financial 
markets are weaker. Such emerging markets fail to gain positive social, financial, and economic benefits 
from the presence of MFIs that attempt to encourage BoP entrepreneurship. In emerging markets 
where loan defaults are high, MFIs become concerned and intensify their costly loan monitoring efforts 
(Fernando, 2006). As a result, both MFIs and the aspiring entrepreneurs may find it difficult to operate 
as viable enterprises and survive. This may result in both MFIs and microentrepreneurs being choked 
out of the underdeveloped and financially weak system (Korosteleva, 2009; Lin, 2010). 
Finally, this study has noteworthy implications regarding the viability of microfinance as a tool to boost 
microentrepreneurship for poverty alleviation in emerging markets. Positioning our findings in the 
related research, we believe we provide insight to the question of “mission drift” in microfinance 
research (Morduch, 2000; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Mission drift is a phenomenon in which MFIs struggle 
to simultaneously (1) encourage BoP entrepreneurship for poverty alleviation at the BoP and (2) 
continue to operate as a viable microfinance business. We believe that it is possible for MFIs to pursue 
both objectives; however, it is contingent on contextual factors, such as FDI and loan defaults. MFIs may 
experience mission drift in institutional arrangements in which the political or social climate encourages 
BoP entrepreneurs to not repay loans, or when the economy lacks the presence of FDI. Thus, while we 
agree that MFIs can and should seek to simultaneously alleviate poverty and operate as viable 
businesses, they may face tremendous difficulties in doing so in emerging markets with low FDI and high 
loan defaults. 
Implications for Practice 
We believe that our study also has important implications for practice. We deem the BoP to be a rich 
source of business and entrepreneurial activity that should not be ignored (Prahalad, 2010; Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). In particular, “businesses can gain three important advantages 
by serving the poor—a new source of revenue growth, greater efficiency, and access to innovation,” 
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002, p. 6). Governments and political leaders of emerging markets can help by 
creating an environment that welcomes FDI and discourages the nonrepayment of loans. This could 
motivate MFIs to provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship without the fear of 
significant costs incurred from operating at the BoP. We believe that providing knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship can aid the aspiring poor to create viable microenterprises, but urge MFIs 
to understand the contextual factors that influence the environments in which they operate. 
Specifically, as a precondition of entry and operation in an emerging market, MFIs should advocate for 
conditions that welcome FDI and discourage nonpayment of loans to government and political leaders. 
Otherwise, the MFIs may find themselves in a tailspin of uncontrollable costs and bad debt, hurting their 
ability to continually encourage BoP entrepreneurship. Thus, it is crucial that MFIs manage client and 
government relationships in manner that is consistent with the context in which they operate (Rottig, 
2007). 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our data allow us to investigate the importance of contextual factors in the relationship between 
providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship by MFIs and the costs of operating at the 
BoP. Our study presents some limitations that can be addressed by future research. First, we explore 
microfinance-led entrepreneurship in emerging markets. Though microfinance is an important catalyst 
of BoP entrepreneurship, it is not the only available mechanism in these markets. Thus, future research 
may investigate the relationships suggested by this study in relation to entrepreneurship that is not 
aided by microfinance. Second, while we chose to focus on two contextual factors, we believe that other 
contextual factors could also play a role. We chose the two contextual factors based on extant academic 
and practitioner-oriented coverage of these contextual factors (Bajaj, 2011; Bateman, 2011; de Sam 
Lazaro, 2011; Goldstein, 2011; Sharpe & Schwart, 2011). Future studies should investigate alternative 
contextual and organizational factors to build on the groundwork laid by this study's findings 
(Chakrabarty, in press; Chakrabarty & Bass, in press; Chakrabarty & Wang, in press). 
Conclusion 
The bottom of the pyramid is often overlooked as a potential source for business opportunities and 
entrepreneurial activity. What is more, contextual factors can play a role in the viability of 
entrepreneurship in emerging markets rife with institutional voids. We argue that FDI and loan defaults 
act as moderators in the association between an MFI's knowledge support to encourage 
entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. Providing knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship is challenging, and might not be worthwhile for MFIs functioning in 
contexts where FDI is low and loan defaults are high. This is because it would add to the MFI's costs of 
operating at the BoP, which could ultimately make the MFI unviable, and give false hope to struggling 
BoP entrepreneurs. In contrast, providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship is feasible 
in contexts where FDI is high and loan defaults are low because it does not contribute to the MFI's costs 
of operating at the BoP. Our findings indicate that the ability of MFIs to provide knowledge support to 
encourage entrepreneurship while operating as viable businesses is contingent on context. Our study 
paves the way for future research on the importance of contextual factors to understand the challenges 
and opportunities presented by the need to encourage entrepreneurship in emerging markets. 
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